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This paper uses a unique data set to assess whether donors' contributions to a nonprofit institution
are affected by the perception that the institution might confer a reciprocal benefit. We study alumni
contributions to an anonymous research university. Inter alia, the data include information on the ages
of the alumni's children, whether they applied for admission to the university, and if so, whether they
were accepted. The premise of our analysis is simple: If alumni believe that donations will increase
the likelihood of admission for their children and if this belief helps motivate their giving, then the
pattern of giving should vary systematically with the ages of their children, whether the children ultimately
apply to university, and the outcome of the admissions process. We refer to this pattern as the child-cycle
of alumni giving. If the child-cycle is operative, one would observe that, ceteris paribus, the presence
of children increases the propensity to give, that giving drops off after the admissions decision is made,
and that the decline is greater when the child is rejected by the university. Further, under the joint hypothesis
that alumni can reasonably predict the likelihood that their children will someday apply to the university
and that reciprocity in the form of a higher probability of admission is expected, we expect that alumni
with children in their early teens who eventually apply will give more than alumni whose teenagers
do not. The evidence is strongly consistent with the child-cycle pattern. Thus, while altruism drives
some giving, the hope for a reciprocal benefit plays a role as well. Using our results, we compute rough














  In an essay on the economics of altruism, Samuelson [1993, p. 143] writes 
Mesmerized by Homo economicus, who acts solely on egoism, 
economists shy away from altruism almost comically. Caught 
in a shameful act of heroism, they aver: “Shucks, it was only 
enlightened self interest.” Sometimes it is. At other times it 
may be only rationalization… “If I rescue somebody’s son, 
someone will rescue mine.”  
 
Samuelson concludes that such arguments render economists guilty of “face saving tau-
tologies.” Bergstrom and Stark [1993, p. 149] similarly criticize economists’ stance to-
ward altruistic behavior: “Why are economists convinced that Homo economicus is self-
ish? No doubt we find considerable support for this hypothesis in the behavior of our 
colleagues.”  
However, the notion that mainstream economics categorically rejects the exis-
tence of altruism is essentially false. As noted below, a substantial theoretical literature 
explicitly allows for the possibility that human behavior is unselfish and draws out the 
implications of altruism in a variety of contexts. Contrary to Samuelson, it would be 
more accurate to characterize economists’ view of the importance of altruism as agnostic 
rather than skeptical. They are willing to contemplate the possibility that altruism is an 
important motivator of behavior, but at the same time do not rule out selfishness. Clot-
felter’s [1985] important volume on charitable giving is typical in this regard. In an in-
troductory section, he provides a list of possible motivations for charity. Some involve 
narrow self-interest, such as the expectation that donors and their families will receive 
services in return, or favorable publicity for their businesses. But the list gives equal 
footing to altruism, associated with social norms or a sense of duty or commitment.    2 
Clotfelter takes no position on the relative importance of the various motivations, mere-
ly observing that they could all be operative.
1 
  Of course, saying that both selfishness and altruism can be present does not tell 
us that both motivations actually guide behavior. This is an empirical question, but 
empirical work using observational data is rare in this area. Perhaps the primary reason 
is the difficulty of measuring the benefits that donors expect to receive. Without quanti-
fiable indicators of the potential selfish benefits, one cannot estimate how responsive 
giving is to their existence.  
  This paper uses a unique data set that allows us to assess whether donors’ con-
tributions to a nonprofit institution are affected by the expectation of a reciprocal bene-
fit. We study alumni contributions to an anonymous selective research university, hen-
ceforth referred to as Anon U. The proprietary data provided by Anon U contain de-
tailed information about donations made by alumni as well as a variety of their eco-
nomic and demographic characteristics. The data also include information on the ages of 
the children of the alumni, whether they applied for admission to Anon U, and if so, 
whether they were accepted. The premise of our analysis is simple: If alumni believe 
that donations increase the likelihood of their children being accepted to Anon U and if 
this belief helps motivate their giving, then the pattern of giving should vary systemati-
cally with the age of their children, whether the children ultimately apply to Anon U, 
and the outcome of the admissions process. Specifically, if reciprocity influences the be-
havior of donors, one would expect that, ceteris paribus, the presence of children in-
creases the propensity to give, that giving drops off after the admissions decision is ren-
dered, and that the decline is greater when the child is rejected. We refer to this pattern 
as the child-cycle of alumni giving.  
                                                 
1 In the same way, Dugan et al. [1999, p.2] ascribe a number of motivations to university donors. The list includes 
“avoidance of social stigma, tax incentives, recognition for generosity, a response to past or deterrence to future so-
licitation, and quid pro quo for services rendered indirectly such as access to elite social circles or business con-
tacts.” However, at the top of their list is “pure altruism.”    3 
  An interesting feature of this phenomenon is that the institution makes no prom-
ise of reciprocity whatsoever. True, children of Anon U alumni have a higher rate of ac-
ceptance than other students,
2 but this does not prove that having a parent who made 
donations in the past increases a child’s likelihood of admission. Nevertheless, the view 
that reciprocity exists is widespread. As one account of the college admissions process 
stated, “Traditionally, universities have relied on gifts from alumni, who are rewarded 
with ‘legacy’ preferences for their children.” [Golden, 2006, p. A10]. Perceptions of re-
ciprocity may be reinforced by university administrators who link the acceptance of 
alumni children to financial support of their institutions. In a recent interview with the 
Wall Street Journal, the president of Princeton University was asked, “Why does Prin-
ceton give admissions preference to alumni children…?” Her response was, “We are 
deeply dependent on the generosity of our alumni each and every year… They are ex-
tremely important to the financial well-being of this university.” (Hechinger [2006, p. 
B1]). We know of no statistical evidence on whether alumni donations at any university 
affect admissions probabilities for their children, and if so, how much. For our purposes, 
the key insight is that generating the child-cycle of alumni giving requires only the per-
ception of reciprocity.  
  Determining whether a child life-cycle exists is important because of the oppor-
tunity it provides to shed light on the general issue of altruism. Gaining a better under-
standing of the motivations for alumni giving is also of independent interest because of 
its importance to the financing of higher education. In 2004-05, alumni contributed $7.1 
billion to higher education, about 28 percent of all voluntary support.
3 
                                                 
2 According to public information, children of alumni at Anon U are accepted at roughly three times the rate as other 
applicants. However, Bowen et al. [2005] document the importance of correcting for differences in the characteris-
tics of applicant pools when assessing the importance of legacy preferences. 
3 Other sources of voluntary support include other individuals, corporations, foundations, and religious and other 
organizations. See Chronicle of Higher Education [2006].    4 
  In Section 2 we briefly review some pertinent previous research in this area, with 
particular emphasis on theoretical work that helps motivate a child-cycle framework. 
Section 3 describes the data and econometric framework. The results are presented in 
Section 4. The evidence is strongly consistent with the child-cycle pattern. Alumni par-
ents of teenage children who eventually apply to Anon U make larger donations than 
alumni whose children do not eventually apply. Once an alumnus’s child is accepted, his 
donations fall off substantially. If the child is rejected, giving falls off dramatically. Sec-
tion 5 discusses the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications of the model. 
Section 6 concludes with a summary and suggestions for additional research. 
 
2. Previous Literature 
  The role of altruism in human behavior has long been of interest to economists. 
As Kolm [2000b, p. 7] notes, “all great economists have considered the effects of positive 
social sentiments,” including Smith, Mill, Walras, Pareto, and Bentham. In more recent 
times, notions of altruism have been brought to bear in theoretical analyses of charitable 
giving (Becker [1974]), rescues (Landes and Posner [1978]), commercial policy (Rotem-
berg [2000]) and remittances of migrants to their home countries (Docquier and Rapo-
port [2000]), among other important social phenomena. Additional examples can be 
found in Kolm [2000a].  
  Altruistic behavior within families has received particularly extensive attention 
because of its implications for several important policy questions. In particular, the effi-
cacy of fiscal policy hinges on the extent to which intergenerational bequests are moti-
vated by altruism. Becker [1974] considers a theoretical model in which parents are al-
truistic and shows that, under certain assumptions — an important one being that par-
ents’ utility depends only on family income — they have no incentives to be strategic 
with respect to their children. In contrast, Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers [1985] de-   5 
velop a theory in which bequests are motivated not only by altruistic concern for chil-
dren, but also with the hope for reciprocity in the form of care or attention. 
  Theories relating to intra-family altruism have been tested in a rich econometric 
literature. This literature has developed because there are observable variables related 
to the selfish gains that might be obtained from seemingly altruistic behavior. For ex-
ample, one can look at the amount of contact between elderly parents and children and 
how it is related to the parents’ bequeathable wealth. The results are mixed. Bernheim, 
Shleifer and Summers [1985], Altonji et al. [1992] and Cigno and Rosati [2000] find evi-
dence that gifts from parents to children have a strategic component, while McGarry 
and Schoeni [1995], Raut and Tran [2000] and Ioannides and Kan [2000] find that altru-
istic motives predominate. 
  Turning to the important case of charitable donations — which amounted to 
about $250 billion in 2004
4 — researchers have more or less taken for granted that self-
ish motives play a role. According to Clotfelter [1985, p. 38], “Individuals may volunteer 
for organizations in order for their families or themselves to consume services.” Weis-
brod [1978, p. 34] is more pointed: “The extent to which narrow self-interest lies behind 
the donations of money and time to non-profit organizations is little understood, but 
there can be no doubt that donors often do benefit through the making of business con-
tacts and the receipt of favorable publicity for good deeds.” Similarly, it has been sug-
gested that selfish motives may underlie donations to universities: “Donors demand at-
tention and prestige supplied by college fund raisers”
5 [Yoo and Harrison,1989, p. 367]. 
  Are such assertions valid? Schokkaert and Van Ootegem [2000] provide extensive 
survey evidence of reasons for giving. Also, a number of laboratory experiments have 
                                                 
4 Giving USA Foundation [2005]. 
5 This suggests that efforts by college development offices could be an important determinant of alumni 
giving. Certainly this is why colleges have such offices in the first place. While there is some evidence of a 
correlation between development costs and donations across institutions (Harrison, et al. [1995]), it is dif-
ficult to ascribe a causal relationship because the variables are likely jointly determined.    6 
investigated the extent to which contributions to public goods are marked by altruism. 
(See, for example, Andreoni [1993] and List [2006].
6 ) However, in marked contrast to 
the literature on giving within the family, we have been able to find no statistical work 
on motivations for charitable giving based on observational data. The same holds for 
the voluminous literature on the determinants of alumni giving to their universities.
7 
Econometric studies of alumni giving have examined a wide array of variables: attitudi-
nal measures of satisfaction with the undergraduate experience, income, marital status, 
number of children, occupation, the state of the stock market, marginal tax rates, gen-
der, ethnicity, academic performance as an undergraduate, extracurricular activities in-
cluding varsity athletics, membership in fraternities or other social clubs, whether the 
individual received financial aid, performance of athletic teams, and so on.
8 However, we 
have found no systematic attempts at all to assess whether self-interest might have a 
role in explaining giving behavior. 
  The likely reason for the dearth of such research is the absence of measurable in-
dicators of the benefits that donors expect to receive in return for their donations. Our 
study is premised on the notion that alumni believe that donations enhance the prob-
ability that their children will be admitted to their alma mater. Therefore, the presence 
of children, their ages, and their admissions status are measurable indicators of the po-
tential for reciprocal benefits generated by donations. In this view, alumni believe that 
donations buy them entrance into a lottery whose prize is admissions for their children.  
  Framing the issue this way suggests a connection between alumni giving and 
Morgan’s [2000] theory of lotteries as a mechanism for financing public goods. Morgan 
observes that lotteries are often held by private charities. He shows that, under a broad 
set of conditions, lotteries raise the level of provision of a public good relative to stan-
                                                 
6 For an ethnographic approach to studying motivations for charitable giving, see Odendahl [1990]. 
7 Taylor and Martin [1995] provide an extensive survey of variables that have been analyzed in previous 
studies. 
8 See, for example, Clotfelter [2003], Monks [2003], Shulman and Bowen [2001, Chapter 10], Taylor and 
Martin [1995], and Wunnava and Lauze [2001].    7 
dard voluntary contribution schemes—a lottery increases giving, ceteris paribus. An-
other of Morgan’s important findings is that as the lottery becomes more “discriminat-
ing” (that is, the prize is more likely to go to whomever donates the most money), the 
overall giving level increases.
9 
  Our child-cycle framework fits well within Morgan’s model. Here, the public good 
is the donation to the university, which benefits its students, faculty, and society at 
large. The power of our test comes from the fact that only alumni with children can 
play the lottery, and among those who have children, the value depends on their ages. 
In particular, the value is relatively high for the parents of teenagers who plan to apply 
to their parents’ alma mater. On the other hand, once a child is past the college admis-
sions age, playing the lottery has no value at all. 
  As we stressed above, whether the probability of one’s child being admitted de-
pends on prior or expected future donations is unknown.
10 However, as long as alumni 
perceive that their contributions improve their children’s chances of being admitted and 
that greater contributions by others lessen the odds, Morgan’s mechanism is operative.
11 
  
3. Data and Econometric Model 
  3.1 Data 
  
Our primary data source is the administrative archives of Anon U’s Development 
Office, which contain information on all alumni donations from 1983 to 2006. The data 
are proprietary and sensitive, and individuals’ names were stripped from the records be-
fore being made available to us. Our unit of observation is a yearly giving opportunity. 
                                                 
9 This particular result is demonstrated in an unpublished 1995 working paper with the same title as the 
published version. 
10 In particular, our data do not allow us to explore this hypothesis for Anon U as we have no information 
on the attributes of rejected students. (See below.)  
11 However, the mapping from Morgan’s model into the alumni donation problem is not perfect. The 
model assumes that the impact on the amount that is donated upon the probability of winning is common 
knowledge, which is clearly not true in our context.    8 
For example, if an individual has been an alumna for 5 years, she accounts for 5 giving 
opportunities in our analysis, starting in the first fiscal year after graduation. Multiple 
gifts in the same year are summed together. The Development Office data also include 
information on academic major, extracurricular activities when the alumnus was an un-
dergraduate, post graduate education, occupation, residence, whether he or she is mar-
ried to another graduate of Anon U, as well as information on the age and admissions 
status of the alumnus’s children. Anon U’s Registrar supplemented these data with in-
formation on SAT scores, academic honors, ethnicity, type of high school, summary 
evaluations made by the Admissions Office during the application process, and grade 
point average. The Registrar’s data are available only for the classes of 1972 and on-
wards, so we restrict most of our analysis to this group of individuals.  
We begin with 547,836 observations, representing 35,556 alumni. We delete 
27,992 observations because of missing data on the child’s age, essential information for 
our analysis. 1,100 observations were deleted because the child withdrew his or her ap-
plication before a decision was rendered, and another 32,041 because of missing data for 
other variables. Altogether, our analysis sample has 487,913 observations on a total of 
32,488 alumni.  
  We focus on three dimensions of alumni giving. First is the probability that an 
alumnus made any gift at all in a given year.
12 Universities care about the proportion of 
their alumni who make donations. Anon U, for example, makes considerable efforts to 
contact as many alumni as possible, and urge them to give something, even if it is just a 
few dollars. Second, we analyze the amount donated in any given year. Third, as is typ-
ically the case, a few relatively large gifts account for a disproportionate amount of 
Anon U’s donations. For example, in 2006, the top one percent of gifts accounted for 
69.2 percent of total giving. We estimate the probability that the alumnus is a “class 
                                                 
12 Pledges without an associated gift are not counted.    9 
leader” in a given year, where a class leader is defined as an individual who donated an 
amount greater than or equal to the 90
th percentile of gifts in his or her class.  
  The mean and standard deviation of each of these variables are shown at the top 
of Table 1.
13 The unconditional mean gift (in 2006 dollars) is $466. The relatively large 
standard deviation, $49,512, reflects the presence of enormous outliers. To reduce the 
likelihood that outliers drive our results, we take the log of the amount given.
 14 In addi-
tion, we also estimate our models (except for class leader) without the top 1 percent of 
the observations, and find that the results are essentially unchanged. With respect to 
the probability of giving, Table 1 shows that about 55.6 percent of the giving opportuni-
ties result in a donation to the university.  
  Most of the explanatory variables in the table are dichotomous. For each set of 
dichotomous variables, the “omitted category” is the variable that is excluded from the 
regressions. About 65.1 percent of our observations are associated with male alumni. 
Historically, Anon U was an all-male institution, and did not confer degrees upon wom-
en until the 1970s. Whites comprise 81.9 percent of our observations. 57.9 percent of the 
observations are associated with secondary education at a public school; almost 39 per-
cent with participation in undergraduate varsity athletics
15; and 45.3 percent with indi-
viduals who receive honors when they graduate. About 40 percent receive a post bacca-
laureate degree.  
  Unfortunately, the data include no direct information on income, an important 
determinant of giving (Shulman and Bowen [2001, p. 404]). We address this issue in two 
ways. First, for a large subset of our alumni, we have information that is closely related 
                                                 
13 As noted above, these are summary statistics of our observations, which are not the same as summary 
statistics for the alumni themselves. In effect, the data in the table weight alumni characteristics by the 
number of years each alumnus was in the sample. Therefore, changes in the demographic structure of 
Anon U may not be fully evident. 
14A logarithmic transformation presents problems for observations that take a value of zero. As noted be-
low, we set 320 gifts that are greater than zero but less than or equal to $1.00 equal to $1.01. Therefore, 
observations for which there is no giving are associated with $1, whose logarithm is zero.  
15 Varsity athletes are defined as those who participated in a varsity-level sport, not necessarily receiving 
a varsity letter. Club sports are defined as those that do not confer a varsity letter.    10 
to permanent income, occupation and field.
16 Table 2 shows the occupations and fields 
for the 344,342 observations, representing 20,039 alumni, for which we have this infor-
mation.
17 The fields of education, finance, health care and law are highly represented. 
We re-estimate our basic models with this subsample including the occupation and field 
data in order to see whether our substantive results are sensitive to their inclusion. As 
shown below, they are not. Second, if we are willing to think of an alumnus’s permanent 
income as an unchanging attribute (at least during our sample period), then we can 
model it as a fixed effect. We show below that our substantive results are unchanged 
with fixed effects estimation. 
  3.2 Characterizing the Child-Cycle. 
  We characterize the child-cycle by a vector of dichotomous variables indicating 
whether the alumnus has a child, and if so, his or her age and admissions status. We 
discuss the treatment of families with several children below. Recall that in our frame-
work, alumni with children believe that a gift to Anon U may some day generate a re-
ciprocal benefit, and therefore the presence of a child should increase the probability of 
making a gift. Perhaps, though, having a child is correlated with unobserved variables 
that also drive giving decisions. For example, individuals who become parents might 
care about young people in general, and hence be particularly willing to support higher 
education. But if so, there would be no reason to expect giving to decline just when the 
child exceeds the age at which college admissions decisions are made. In contrast, the 
child-cycle framework implies that once the child is beyond that age, giving will drop 
off, because the admissions lottery is over. To examine how giving varies with the age of 
the child, we include a series of dichotomous variables, CHILDi, which take a value of 
                                                 
16 In this context, it is important to note that a number of the variables in our basic specification are also 
correlated with income, including gender, ethnicity, college major and grade point average, advanced de-
grees, years since graduation, and location.  Moreover, Cunningham and Cochi-Ficano (2002) point out 
that SAT scores are closely related to family socioeconomic status as well.  
17 Due to lack of reliable data regarding the start- and stop-dates of occupation and field, these variables 
indicate whether the alumnus was ever involved in that field or occupation, rather than whether they are 
involved during the particular year of observation.    11 
one if the alumnus has a child of age i and zero otherwise. The range of i is from zero 
(less than one year old) to 26 years and older. 
  Even if giving increases as admissions time approaches (at approximately 18 
years old) and falls thereafter, hopes for reciprocity need not be at work. Perhaps, for 
example, a child of college age reawakens fond memories of an alumnus’s undergraduate 
days, or inspires thoughts of experiences that the alumnus and his child might share 
during future parents’ weekends. This could lead to an increase in an alumnus’s propen-
sity to give. To investigate this possibility, we take advantage of information on 
whether the child ultimately applies for admission. Suppose that by the time the child is 
a teenager, an alumnus can reasonably estimate the probability that his or her child will 
ultimately apply. Such an estimate could be based on the child’s expressed preferences 
for type of college, academic performance, and so on. If so, the perceived payoff to the 
admissions lottery should be higher for alumni whose children ultimately apply than 
those who do not and so should their donations. We therefore include a set of interac-
tion terms, CHILDiAppl, which multiply CHILDi by a dichotomous variable that equals 
one if a child of age i eventually applied to Anon U and zero otherwise. We assume that 
parents can form reasonably accurate expectations about whether their children will ap-
ply only when the children are into their teens, so that CHILDiAppl is defined only for 
values of i from 14 through 17. Under the joint hypothesis that alumni can predict with 
some accuracy whether their children will apply and that expected reciprocity is a moti-
vation for giving, these interaction terms should have positive coefficients.  
  Similarly, we define a series of dichotomous variables, CHILDiNoAppl, which 
equal one if the child ultimately did not apply and zero otherwise, with i running from 
14 to 17. If expected reciprocity is present, the coefficients on these variables will be 
smaller than those associated with the CHILDiAppl variables, but still positive. They 
remain positive because presumably some parents in this group believe that their chil-   12 
dren will apply, so their giving should be higher than that of members of the omitted 
category, who have no children at all. A third series of dichotomous variables, CHILDi-
Young, equal of one if the child was not old enough to have applied by the end of our 
sample in 2006, with i running from 14 to 16.   
  Turning now to the outcome of the admissions decision, we expect it to have no 
impact on giving if altruism is the only motivation. On the other hand, to the extent 
that giving is motivated by expected reciprocity, we expect parents of admitted children 
to reduce giving, as there is no longer an expected gain.
18 This effect will be attenuated 
if these alumni perceive that Anon U has “held up its side of the bargain,” and recipro-
cate by continuing to give. Below, we examine some other reasons why admittance of 
one’s child might not lead to a dramatic decrease in giving. Turning now to the parents 
of rejected children, not only is the prospect of an expected gain gone, but the alumnus 
may perceive that the university has not reciprocated properly, and therefore retaliates 
by reducing donations even further.  
To examine these conjectures about the impact of the admissions decision, we 
create a set of dichotomous variables, CHILDiAcc, which equal one if the child applied 
to Anon U and was accepted and zero otherwise; and CHILDiRej, which equal one if the 
child applied to Anon U and was rejected and zero otherwise.
19 For these variables, i 
runs from 18 through 26 and over. 
  A complication arises when families have multiple children: which one should be 
used for characterizing the child-cycle? In our basic results reported below, all the child-
cycle variables are defined in terms of the first child. This makes sense because the giv-
ing decision surrounding the first child is unaffected by any prior personal experience of 
                                                 
18 Reduced giving after admissions might be driven by income effects associated with tuition payments. If 
tuition is the important factor, then we would also expect to see decreases in giving among alumni whose 
children did not apply to Anon U but instead attended other institutions. As shown below, these alumni 
do not exhibit anything like the substantial decreases in giving that we see for the alumni of accepted 
children. 
19 The data allow us to distinguish between those who are accepted but do not attend and those who do 
attend. However, nearly all of Anon U’s alumni children who are accepted to Anon U choose to attend; 
therefore, sample sizes are too small to accurately measure any differences in the two populations.    13 
reciprocity. However, some of the giving that occurs during the first child’s cycle might 
be affected by the presence of younger children. For example, alumni might continue to 
make large donations after their first child is accepted out of concern about the admis-
sions prospects of younger children. Given the large number of child cycle variables, it is 
infeasible to include in one model the cycles for multiple children and their interactions. 
Therefore, we simply estimate the child-cycle based on the last child in the family. As 
shown below, the substantive results are essentially the same as those based on the first 
child.  
  It would be cumbersome and uninformative to report summary statistics for each 
of the large number of variables that characterize the child-cycle. To provide some basic 
information, we note that in 2006, the last year of our sample, 23.5 percent of the alum-
ni had at least one child; of those who had a child, the mean age was 13.6 years. Condi-
tional on reaching age 17, 1,501 alumni children, representing 52.9 percent of that sub-
sample, had applied to Anon U, and 37.2 percent were accepted. 
 
  3.4 Econometric Model 
We model the decision to make a gift to Anon U with a probit model: 
Prob(G jt) = Φ[α + CYCLE jtβ1 + X jtγ + YEARtβ2 + LOC jtβ3 + CLASS jβ4] ,   
where Prob(Gjt) is the probability that alumnus j makes a gift in year t, Φ[•] is the cu-
mulative normal distribution function, CYCLE jt is the vector of variables characterizing 
the child-cycle as discussed above, Xjt is a vector of the alumnus’s personal characteris-
tics, YEARt is a set of time effects, LOCjt is a set of location effects (state or foreign 
country of residence) and CLASSj is a set of class effects (equal to one if the alumnus 
graduated in a given year and zero otherwise). The time effects account for the impacts    14 
of the state of the business cycle, the stock market, and so on.
20 The class effects control 
for common influences on alumni in the same class, such as the political milieu when 
they were undergraduates, the presence of certain professors or administrators, and so 
on.  
  As noted above, we have more than one observation per alumnus. Because the 
errors for the observations on a given alumnus are likely to be correlated, the standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering within individuals. Our analysis of class leaders also 
uses a probit model; here the outcome variable is the probability that in a given year, 
the alumnus made a gift that was greater than or equal to the gift made by the top 10 
percent of his or her classmates. 
  When we turn to the actual amount of the gift, we face two issues that arise in 
all studies of donative behavior. First, a substantial number of the observations are ze-
ro; second, there are a few very large outliers. For example, the three largest gifts in our 
sample are $3.1, $6.0, and $31.1 million. To address the first issue, we use the Tobit es-
timator, which explicitly takes censoring into account. The second problem suggests 
that we transform the data to reduce the influence of outliers. We take logarithms. Be-
cause the logarithm of zero is not defined, we set the 320 positive gifts that were less 
than or equal to one dollar equal to one dollar and one cent. In effect, then, we have 
censoring at the point where the logarithm of the gift is equal to zero, and can then ap-
ply Tobit straightforwardly. There is, of course, some arbitrariness to this procedure. To 
assess its robustness, we also estimate the model in levels, first with the entire sample 
and then eliminating the top one percent of the observations in order to reduce the im-
pact of outliers The substantive results with respect to the child-cycle variables are not 
affected. 
                                                 
20 Bristol [1991] emphasizes the role of the stock market and Ehrenberg and Smith [2003] document the 
importance of macroeconomic conditions. Time effects also take into account changes in the value of the 
university’s endowment (Oster [2001]).    15 
  We assume that the determinants of the amount of giving are the same as those 
that affect the probability of giving. As with the probit estimates, we correct for corre-




  4.1. Probability of Making a Gift 
  Our basic results are reported in Table 3. To begin, column (1) shows each vari-
able’s marginal effect on the probability that an alumnus made any gift in a given year 
and the associated standard error.
21 We discuss the child-cycle variables and then turn 
to the other covariates. 
  Consider first the CHILDi variables, each of which takes a value of one if the 
alumnus had a child of age i during the year of the observation and zero otherwise. 
When a child is born, the probability of making a donation increases by about 13 per-
centage points. The incremental effect of the child’s presence generally increases with 
the child’s age, reaching about 17 percentage points by the time he or she is 13. These 
coefficients are precisely estimated.  
  When children reach the age of 14, we distinguish between those who eventually 
apply to Anon U and those who do not. The figures under the heading Child Did Not 
Apply show the coefficients on interactions of a dichotomous variable equal to one if the 
child did not apply with the child’s age, that is, the CHILDiNoAppl variables. The vari-
ables under Child Did Apply show the corresponding coefficients when the child eventu-
ally did apply, CHILDiAppl in our earlier notation. Comparing the two sets of coeffi-
cients, we see that at every age from 14 to 17, the incremental probability of giving is 
greater for alumni whose children ultimately applied. The differences at each age are 
statistically significant from each other. This differential is consistent with the joint hy-
                                                 
21 The year, class, and location effects are not reported for brevity.     16 
pothesis that alumni can reasonably predict the likelihood that their children will apply 
to Anon U and that reciprocity in the form of admission is expected.
22 
The CHILDiAppl variables are defined only up to the age of 17. After that point, 
we distinguish between successful and unsuccessful applications to Anon U.
23 The coeffi-
cients under the Child Accepted heading indicate that, conditional on applying, the 
probability of giving increases by about 34 percentage points for an alumnus whose 18 
year old child is accepted. The incremental probability falls after acceptance (by age 20 
it is down to 27 percentage points), but remains elevated into the child’s mid-20s. The 
parents of unsuccessful applicants behave very differently. As the figures under Child 
Rejected indicate, the incremental probability of making a gift falls off substantially at 
age 18, and at ages 19 and beyond, it is essentially zero. At each age, the differences be-
tween probabilities for alumni whose children were accepted and those who were not are 
statistically significant except for those whose children were 26 or older. Interestingly, 
having a child rejected lowers the probability of giving to the level of alumni who have 
no children. Indeed, for most ages one cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients 
for individuals without children and parents of rejected children are the same.  
  To provide a better sense of the implications of the child-cycle coefficients in col-
umn (1), we graph them in Figure 1. The horizontal axis measures the child’s age, and 
the vertical axis shows the incremental effect on the probability of making a gift (rela-
tive to having no children). The graph starts when the child is born and shows that 
having a child increases the probability of giving by about 13 percentage points. At age 
14, the line divides, showing the difference between alumni whose children do and do 
not ultimately apply to Anon U. The gap between the two groups is substantial, and it 
widens as the children approach college age. At age 18, the graph splits again, this time 
                                                 
22 Note also that this finding is inconsistent with the notion that the child-cycle pattern is due to the 
fundraising office focusing on alumni with children approaching college age. To explain this finding, one 
would have to argue that the fundraisers have perfect foresight with respect to the future behavior of 
alumni children.  
23 Because our unit of observation is based on an entire year, there is some ambiguity in precisely when 
the admissions decision becomes known. The year in which the child turns 18 is a sensible choice.    17 
between applicants who were rejected and those who were accepted at Anon U. At ad-
missions time, the probability of making a gift falls substantially for alumni whose chil-
dren were rejected. It also declines for those whose children were accepted, albeit by a 
smaller amount.  
  One concern with our interpretation of these findings is that the likelihood of giv-
ing and the likelihood that a child applies to Anon U are both driven by some unob-
served third variable, perhaps the extent to which a parent feels an affinity to Anon U. 
To investigate this possibility, we estimated a model in which CHILDiAppl and CHILD-
iNoAppl are included for ages 0 through 17. If our results are driven by affinity for Anon 
U, then we would expect the differences between these variables at young ages to be as 
important as when the children are teenagers. However, this is not the case. When the 
dependent variable is the probability of making a gift, the joint hypothesis that the co-
efficients on CHILDiAppl and CHILDiNoAppl are equal for ages 0 through 13 cannot be 
rejected (p = 0.1415). The same is true for amount given (p = 0.3083) and annual class 
leader (p = 0.6902). These findings increase our confidence that the child-cycle results 
are not being driven the alumnus’s unobservable affinity for Anon U. Further evidence 
along these lines is presented in Section 5 below.  
  The patterns in Figure 1 cannot readily be explained by public good provision or 
by a “warm glow” from giving. In contrast, the results fit well in the child-cycle frame-
work.  
 Other  variables. The coefficients on the linear and quadratic terms for years since 
graduation imply that the probability of making a gift falls for about the first 20 years 
after graduation, and then turns upward. With respect to gender, men are 4.6 percent-
age points less likely to donate in a given year, ceteris paribus. Whites are more likely 
to contribute than American Indians, African-Americans, Hispanics or Asians. The gap 
is largest with African-Americans, who are 16 percentage points less likely to make a 
gift than whites. These gender and ethnic/racial differentials are similar to those re-   18 
ported in previous studies (Monks [1993]).
24 Alumni who attended boarding or private 
schools are somewhat more likely to contribute than those who attended public schools. 
There is no discernible impact of home or alternative schooling on the probability of 
giving relative to public school attendees. 
  As noted above, the admissions office produces summary evaluations of appli-
cants on the basis of both non-academic and academic criteria. An A is the highest 
score and an E is the lowest score. Alumni who received the lowest non-academic rat-
ings at the time of admissions are 6.9 percentage points less likely to make donations. 
On the other hand, students in the highest academic category are somewhat less likely 
to make donations than those with lower ratings. SAT scores do not appear to have any 
statistically significant impact on the probability of giving. 
  We now turn from variables that are known before matriculation at Anon U to 
those that reflect the alumnus’s undergraduate experiences. Involvement in a varsity 
sport increases the probability of giving by about 5 percentage points, and membership 
in one of Anon U’s fraternities or sororities increases it by 13 percentage points.
25 These 
results are consistent with previous findings that students who were actively engaged in 
extracurricular activities as undergraduates are more likely to make donations as alumni 
(Dugan et al. [1999]). With respect to academic performance, receiving honors has no 
effect on the probability of giving. However, the probability of giving increases with 
grade point average (GPA). Those in the bottom quartile of the GPA distribution were 
5.7 percentage points less likely to make a gift, while those in the third quartile were 2.1 
percentage points less likely. There is no significant difference in giving between the sec-
ond and top quartiles. 
                                                 
24 Some of these differentials may be due to the fact that income and wealth differ across ethnic groups. 
As noted below, when we re-estimate the model for a subsample of our data which includes some reason-
able measures of permanent income, the differentials do not disappear.  
25 Several organizations did not provide membership information for the class of 2001 and above. Interact-
ing indicators for those classes with the Greek indicator did not change the estimate of the main coeffi-
cient substantially.    19 
  Consistent with earlier studies, giving patterns differ substantially by course of 
study (Dugan, et al. [1999], Monks [2003]). Alumni who majored in engineering, eco-
nomics and public policy have relatively high probabilities of making a gift later in life; 
majors in the small social sciences departments (such as sociology) and small humanities 
departments (such as linguistics) tend to have relatively low probabilities. Students with 
minors in finance are more likely to make subsequent gifts (by about 9 percentage 
points), while those with minors in theater are less likely (by about 7 percentage 
points). 
  Turning to schooling after Anon U, alumni who continue their education are 
more likely to make donations than those who do not, a finding consistent with previous 
studies (Dugan et al., [1999], Monks [2003]). Finally, we note that, consistent with pre-
vious research (Grant and Lindauer [1986], Olsen et al. [1989]) the likelihood of giving 
increases substantially during reunion years, with the probability increasing by 6.3 per-
centage points. 
  Taken together, our results are very much in line with those from previous stud-
ies. While no school is “typical,” Anon U appears not to be idiosyncratic with respect to 
the determinants of the donation decision. It is not unreasonable to expect, therefore, 
that the child-cycle results would also generalize to other selective institutions. 
  4.2 Amount of Giving 
  Each entry in column (2) of Table 3 shows the unconditional marginal effect of 
the corresponding variable on the amount given. Because the dependent variable is the 
logarithm of giving, small coefficients are approximately percentage changes. However, 
this approximation is not very good for large coefficients, so caution is required in their 
interpretation. Qualitatively, just as in column 1, the coefficients are consistent with the 
child-cycle framework. Having a child increases the expected logarithm of the amount of 
giving by 0.76, or roughly 114 percent. Once the child enters the teens, parents whose 
children eventually apply to Anon U give more than parents whose children do not. For    20 
example, at age 15, the logarithm of giving is 1.38 higher (about 223 percent) for par-
ents of future applicants than for individuals without children. The corresponding coeffi-
cient for alumni whose children do not eventually apply is 1.01 (about 175 percent). For 
parents of successful applicants, giving remains elevated after admission; the incre-
mental effect on the logarithm of giving at age 18 is about 2.5 (about 1150 percent). For 
parents of rejectees, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the incremental effect on the 
amount of giving falls to about zero at age 19. As we saw for the probability of giving, 
the parents of rejected applicants behave no differently than alumni without children. 
The child-cycle coefficients are graphed in Figure 2. 
  Figure 2 allows us to address that possibility that reduced giving after admissions 
might be driven by income effects associated with tuition payments. If tuition were the 
important factor, then we would also expect to see decreases in giving among alumni 
whose children did not apply to Anon U but instead attended other institutions. As 
Figure 2 demonstrates, these alumni do not exhibit anything like the substantial de-
creases in giving that we see for the alumni of accepted children.
26 
  Another issue pertaining to the child-cycle interpretation of Figure 2 is that the 
overall giving over an alumnus’s life may not be affected much by having an eligible 
child, just the timing of donations. To investigate this possibility, we estimate a cross 
sectional regression in which the left-hand side variable was lifetime giving as of 2006,
27 
and the right hand side included the basic demographic variables in Table 3 (minus the 
child-cycle variables) augmented with a series of dichotomous variables for number of 
children, and continuous variables for the age of each child. We find that lifetime giving 
is 109 percent higher for alumni with one child and an additional 58 percent higher with 
a second child. Further, lifetime giving increases by 5.1 percent for each year of the first 
                                                 
26 Another argument along the same lines is that when one’s child is accepted at another institution, new 
opportunities for charitable giving open at that institution. Again, though, if this were the case, we would 
expect the behavior of the parents of rejected children and the parents of children who never applied to 
be about the same, in contrast to Figure 2. 
27 Specifically, this is computed as the sum of giving in constant dollars over all years that the alumnus 
has been in the sample.    21 
child’s age and 2.0 percent for each year of the second child’s age. In short, life-time 
giving is affected by the presence and age of children; the child-cycle does not arise sim-
ply because alumni are shifting donations over time. 
  The coefficients on the other variables in column (2) generally have the same 
signs as those for the probability of giving in column (1). One possible concern is that 
even after taking logs, the estimates in column (2) might be driven by outliers. We es-
timate the model after deleting the largest one percent of the gifts, and no substantive 
differences emerge. To assess the sensitivity of our results to the logarithmic transforma-
tion, we also estimate the Tobit equation in levels (with censoring at zero), both with 
and without the top one percent of gifts deleted. As shown in the Appendix figures, the 
child cycle is robust with respect to this change in functional form.  
  4.3 Probability of Being a Class Leader 
  As is true at most universities, the majority of money donated to Anon U comes 
from a few very generous donors. Column (3) of Table 3 examines the probability of be-
ing a class leader, defined as an individual whose gift was greater than or equal to the 
90
th percentile in his or her class. When interpreting these figures, recall that, by defini-
tion, the probability of a random person being a class leader is about 10 percent. There-
fore, if a given characteristic raises the probability by (say) 5 percentage points, this 
represents a 50 percent increase relative to the mean.  
The coefficients indicate that, for this dimension of giving as well, the child-cycle 
pattern is present and very similar to the patterns we have already seen. These coeffi-
cients are graphed in Figure 3. The other covariates are generally similar in sign to 
those in the other two columns. An important exception is gender. While women are 
more likely to make a gift in a given year (column (1)) and to make larger gifts on aver-
age (column (2)), ceteris paribus, column (3) tells us that the probability of making a 
very large gift is 1.2 percentage points higher for males. 
    22 
4.4 The Role of Directed Giving 
Giving by parents of accepted children remains high after the admissions decision 
has been rendered, a result that is not necessarily wholly consistent with the child cycle 
model. After all, the lottery has been decided; why continue to buy tickets? Perhaps the 
alumnus is showing tangible evidence of warm feelings engendered by the acceptance of 
his or her child.
28 Without ruling out this explanation, we note that another force may 
be operative: certain donations made by alumni with children on campus could be less 
public goods than relatively targeted benefits for their progeny. An example is a dona-
tion earmarked for a child’s varsity team.  
To explore this possibility, we estimate the probability that an alumnus makes a 
directed gift in a particular year as a function of the variables in Table 3.
29 We find 
that, conditional on making any gift, alumni with 17-year old children who are applying 
to Anon U are 3.4 percentage points more likely to make a directed gift than alumni 
who have no children, and the difference is statistically significant. After admission, this 
figure increases substantially. Alumni with 18 year old accepted children are 6.1 per-
centage points more likely to make a directed gift, while those whose accepted children 
are 19 years old are 12.8 percentage points more likely. The impact of having a child 
accepted at Anon U on directed giving peaks at 16.5 percentage points when the child is 
21. It remains statistically significant through age 25, but drops to an insignificant -0.22 
percentage points for children aged 26 and older. In contrast, conditional on giving, the 
parents of rejected children are not significantly more likely to make a directed gift 
when their children are of college age.
30  
In short, during the time an alumnus’s child is on campus, the probability of 
making a gift aimed at specific purposes, conditional on making a gift at all, is elevated. 
                                                 
28 Another possibility is that the alumnus is concerned about admissions prospects for younger children. 
However, as shown below, the same tendency exists when we look at the child-cycle for the last child in 
the family.  
29 A directed gift is defined as one not made to the general annual appeal. 
30 The full set of results is available upon request.    23 
This phenomenon might be due to the fact that prior to the matriculation of their chil-
dren, parents know little about the activities of certain campus organizations, or even of 
their existence. But if that is the case, it is hard to explain why the relative likelihood of 
directed giving drops after the child graduates. We conjecture that at least part of the 
explanation is that the specific purposes directly benefit the child. Therefore, elevated 
giving after the admission of one’s child may be due in part to non-altruistic motiva-
tions. 
4.5 Basic Model: Summary 
  Whether we look at the probability of making any gift, the size of the gift, or the 
probability of making a large gift (relative to one’s classmates), the child-cycle pattern 
comes through clearly. This is not to say that altruism is unimportant--people without 
any children give substantial amounts of money, after all. For the top 1 percent of all 
gifts, unconditional on class or year, 2,875 gifts came from alumni with children, while 
2,003 came from alumni without any children. Among the top 1 percent of lifetime (cu-
mulative to 2006) givers, 212 had children and 110 did not. However, it is hard to ex-
plain the patterns found in Table 3 on the basis of altruism alone.  
If we are willing to make some strong assumptions, we can be more precise about 
the relative roles played by altruistic and selfish motivations. Specifically, suppose that: 
1) Giving by alumni without children is done without the expectation of receiving any 
reciprocal benefit. Of course, other motivations, such as public recognition or donating 
to research projects that could be useful to one’s business, may also be present. To the 
extent that they are, our estimate of the proportion of giving due to altruism may be 
considered an upper bound. 2) The additional giving by alumni with children who do 
not ultimately apply to Anon U is unselfish as well—as conjectured above, it is gener-
ated for one reason or another by warm feelings toward Anon U that are associated    24 
with having children.
31 3) The additional giving by alumni whose children do apply is 
motivated by self-interest. Under these assumptions, we can use our estimates of the dif-
ference in giving associated with a child who did not apply relative to a child who did 
apply to estimate the self-interested component of giving. A complication arises because 
this differential depends on the child’s age. Seventeen years seems a sensible choice, be-
cause at this age, the application choice has generally been made so that alumni whose 
children do not apply are not making any precautionary donations. At the same time, 
these children have not yet been accepted, so parents do not have an incentive to make 
directed donations as discussed in Section 4.4. For the same reason, neither can dona-
tions be influenced by warm feelings due to the acceptance of one’s child.  
Under these assumptions and using the coefficients on CHILD17Appl and 
CHILD17NoAppl from column (2) of Table 3, we calculate that about 52 percent of giv-
ing by alumni whose children apply to Anon U is due to altruism and the remaining 48 
percent is due to self-interest.
32 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to 
use observational data to decompose donative behavior into altruistic and self-interested 
components, and it suggests that the two motivations are of about equal importance, at 
least in this context. 
 
5. Alternative Specifications 
  In this section we present some alternative specifications of our model in order to 
assess the robustness of the basic results. 
 
                                                 
31 One concern is that giving by alumni whose children do not apply may be motivated by the desire to 
enhance the prospects of younger children. However, as shown below, this portion of the child-cycle for 
the last child in a family is very similar to the child-cycle for the first child. 
32 The calculation is done as follows:  We assume, without loss of generality, that giving associated with 
no children (the baseline) is 1. We then exponentiate the coefficient on CHILD17Appl, which gives us a 
figure of 6.06, the amount donated by alumni whose 17 year old children applied to Anon U, relative to 
the baseline. We next exponentiate the coefficient on CHILD17NoAppl to obtain the relative amount given 
by those whose 17 year old children did not apply, which is 3.14. Under our assumptions, the proportion 
due to altruism has two components: baseline altruism and the increment associated with having children. 
The proportion of giving from baseline altruism is 1/6.06 (= 0.165), while the proportion due to warm 
feelings associated with having children is (3.14-1)/6.06 (= 0.353), and the amount associated with selfish 
reasons is (6.06-3.14)/6.06 (= 0.482).     25 
5.1 Subsequent Children  
  So far we have characterized the child cycle in terms of the first child in the fam-
ily. A possible drawback is that giving along the first child’s cycle could be affected by 
concerns about younger children’s admissions prospects. Therefore, estimating the cycle 
for the last child might allow a cleaner test of the model.
33 We began by re-estimating 
our basic model from Table 3 using information on the last child rather than the first, 
which, in effect, ignores any possible impact of older siblings. All alumni with complete 
data, including those who only have one child, are included in this sample. After delet-
ing observations with missing data on the child’s age (27,882 observations), this sample 
contains 488,297 observations. 
Again, for brevity we present only the graphical representation of the child-cycle 
for amounts given. (See Figure 5.) If anything, the child-cycle pattern is even stronger 
than for the first child. Note that giving by those whose last child was rejected is lower 
than those with no children at all, and significantly so at ages 22 and 23. This is a shar-
per relative decrease than we observed for first children. Within our framework, this 
suggests that parents of rejected first children still give some amount with an eye to-
ward enhancing their younger children’s prospects. But with the last child, this motiva-
tion disappears.
34 
  A natural question is whether the character of the child-cycle is affected by a 
previous child’s outcome. Does acceptance of a first child to Anon U reinforce the no-
tion that donations generate a reciprocal benefit? One way to answer this question 
                                                 
33 For families with only one child, the first child is also considered to be the last. Future children may 
not yet be born, but it is reasonable to expect that at least for the children’s age group that is our pri-
mary interest, 14 years and older, most families are unlikely to have another child. In addition, for some 
families, previous children may be sufficiently old that alumni are concerned about the admissions pros-
pects for grandchildren. 
34 This raises the question of whether other family relationships might be associated with expectations of 
reciprocal benefits to giving. For example, grandparents might make donations hoping to enhance the 
likelihood of admissions for their grandchildren. Unfortunately, in our data set, we are only able to relia-
bly link grandparents and grandchildren when the members of the intermediate generation also attended 
Anon U.  This would leave us with a small and very unrepresentative sample of grandparent-grandchild 
pairs.    26 
would be to interact the child-cycle variables for the second child with indicators for the 
first child’s outcome. However, estimating such a model is infeasible, as it would involve 
hundreds of right hand side variables, many of which are all or nearly all zeros. Instead, 
we augmented the specification for the second child with three indicator variables relat-
ing to the status of the first child: whether the first child was rejected by Anon U, 
whether the first child was accepted, and whether the first child did not apply to Anon 
U at all. Note that these variables are not constant over time; their values change as the 
first child grows older and his or her admissions status becomes known.
35  
We find that the shape of the giving cycle associated with the second child is un-
affected by the inclusion of these variables. However, if the first child is known to have 
been accepted, the entire child cycle shifts upwards. The probability of making a gift 
increases by 11.6 percentage points, while the amount given increases by about 87 per-
cent. If the first child is rejected, the probability of making a gift falls by 6.1 percentage 
points, while the amount given decreases by about 27 percent. (All of these figures are 
statistically significant.) If the first child did not apply, there is no significant change in 
the probability of making a gift or the amount given. These results have a straightfor-
ward interpretation within the child-cycle framework: Rejection of the first child indi-
cates to the alumnus that his or her expectations regarding reciprocity were to some ex-
tent incorrect, and giving behavior is adjusted accordingly. In the same way, acceptance 
of the first child reinforces the perception that reciprocity is present.  
As an additional test, we estimate the cycle for third children.
36 The shape of the 
cycle associated with the third child is very similar to that of both the first and second 
children. The oldest child’s rejection reduces the amount given by 14.5 percent (impre-
cisely estimated), while the second child’s rejection reduces the amount given by a sta-
                                                 
35 In particular, the variables for first child acceptance and rejection can take on a value of one only for 
those years in which the first child is 18 or over, while the indicator for first child non-application can be 
one only for those years in which the first child is 14 and over. 
36 In this specification, there are 493,854 observations representing 32,817 alumni with 1,687 third chil-
dren.    27 
tistically significant 39 percent. The first child’s and second child’s acceptances increase 
the amount given by 134 percent and 118 percent, respectively, and both figures are 
statistically significant. Again, information that reinforces or weakens the perception of 
a reciprocal benefit affects giving. 
5.2 Occupation and Field 
As noted earlier, a drawback of our data set is lack of information on income or 
wealth. However, for a subset of observations, we have detailed information on the 
alumnus’s occupational field and position. We know whether the individual ever worked 
in a number of fields, including consulting, finance, information technology, health care, 
education, and so on. From the position data, we can classify the alumnus as an execu-
tive, government worker, academic, attorney, physician, white collar worker, or some 
other occupation. We believe that this information, together with the variables in our 
basic model, likely do a reasonable job of proxying for permanent income. Using the 
field and position data reduces our sample size substantially, from 487,913 to 344,342 
giving opportunities, which is why we did not include these variables in our basic model. 
When we augment the basic model with the field and position variables, the es-
timated child-cycle is essentially unchanged. For brevity, we do not include the coeffi-
cients here. Rather, we present a graphical summary of the child-cycle for the amount 
given in Figure 4. The same tendencies that we saw in Figure 1 are clearly present. 
Hence, the existence of a child-cycle is not sensitive to the inclusion of a rich set of vari-
ables relating to the alumnus’s permanent income.
37 
 
                                                 
37 Although the child-cycle coefficients do not substantially change, we note in passing that some of the 
other coefficients do. For example, in our basic model, being an economics major increases the amount of 
giving by about 85 percent (computed from column (2) of Table 3). However, once we take occupation 
into account, this figure falls to 37 percent. In part, the coefficient in Table 3 reflects the fact that Anon 
U’s economics majors are particularly likely to go into the field of finance which, by itself, increases the 
amount of giving by about 75 percent, ceteris paribus. Interestingly, the coefficients on the race variables 
do not change substantially; for instance, the independent effect of being black is -56.8 percent in the ba-
sic model and -59.4 percent when we augment the model with occupation and field. Other race variables 
are similarly unaffected. Detailed estimates for these models are available upon request.    28 
5.3 Permanent Income and Fixed Effects Estimation  
Another approach to dealing with missing income data begins with the hypothe-
sis that giving depends on the alumnus’s permanent income. If so, then a sensible alter-
native is fixed effects estimation, which controls for any attributes of an alumnus that 
do not change over time (or at least over the length of our sample period). Indeed, a 
fixed effects model takes into account any time-invariant unobservable variables that 
might drive both giving behavior and the admissions status of an alumnus’s child, and 
hence confound the child-cycle interpretation of our findings. Such unobservables in-
clude affinity to Anon U, generosity, quality of undergraduate experience, and so on. 
Estimating fixed effects in a probit model is not possible, and doing so with Tobit is 
cumbersome. Therefore, we use ordinary least squares. Figures 6, 7, and 8 show the 
child-cycles for the probability of giving, the amount given, and the probability of being 
a class leader, respectively. If our results were in fact being driven by permanent income 
or other time-invariant unobservables, then the child cycle would be less pronounced 
than previously, or perhaps disappear altogether. However, if anything, the fixed effects 
estimates are more consistent with the child-cycle framework. The probability that an 
alumnus with an accepted 22 year old child makes a gift is 18.5 percentage points higher 
than for an alumnus without children. But this differential trends downward to 8.5 per-
centage points by age 25. The incremental probability of an alumnus with a rejected 
child making a gift drops to -.044 percentage points at age 19 and stays insignificantly 
different from the probability for a childless alumnus. The results for amount given and 
probability of being a class leader are similarly pronounced. We conclude that our re-
sults are not likely affected by time-invariant unobservable variables.  
5.4 Augmented Sample 
Our analysis sample is based on alumni who graduated between 1972 and 2005. 
We have additional data on alumni who graduated before 1972. This sample, which in-
cludes alumni from classes as early as 1914, is far larger: 939,671 giving opportunities    29 
between 1983 and 2006. It has many more alumni children who are at college age and 
beyond, a group that is essential to estimating the child-cycle. The number of children 
who applied since 1983 is 5,096 (41.9 percent of whom were accepted), compared to 
1,501 in our basic sample. The tradeoff is a less rich set of explanatory variables, be-
cause we lack data on SAT scores, admissions rating, race, grade point average, secon-
dary school type, and honors for the pre-1972 classes. This section presents results based 
on the augmented sample. 
Figures 9, 10, and 11 show the child-cycles for the probability of giving, the 
amount given, and the probability of being a class leader, respectively. The results are 
nearly identical to those from the basic sample. The only noticeable difference is in Fig-
ure 10, which shows that although the relative amount given by parents of rejected 
children falls, it does not actually become statistically indistinguishable from childless 
alumni. The key point, though, is that our main results continue to hold using a data 
set with much more information on a critical group of alumni, those with children old 
enough to have gone through the admissions process.  
 
6. Conclusions 
  Our starting point is an old question in economics: To what extent does philan-
thropy stem from altruism rather than the expectation of receiving some reciprocal 
benefit? Research on this topic using observational data is rare because quantifying a 
reciprocal benefit is difficult. To address the problem, we analyze a unique data set that 
allows us to estimate how alumni contributions to a university relate to a perceived 
benefit—an improvement in the likelihood that their children will be admitted.  
  We find that the presence of children increases an alumnus’s giving, that giving 
drops off after the admissions decision, and that the decline is far greater when the child 
is rejected. In short, alumni giving varies systematically with the age and admissions 
status of their children. This child-cycle of alumni giving is consistent with the hypothe-   30 
sis that some donations are made in the hope of a reciprocal benefit. The result is robust 
to choice of estimation method and alternative specifications of the model, and does not 
appear to be due to unobservable variables such as underlying affinity to the university. 
  Our results do not imply that self-interest is the only motivation behind donative 
behavior. As we document in the text, many alumni with no apparent reason to expect 
a reciprocal benefit, at least in terms of a higher admissions probability for their chil-
dren, are extraordinarily generous. In the context of the larger debate over the motiva-
tions for altruism, our analysis shows that both selflessness and giving with the hope of 
reciprocity are present. 
  We do not know whether these results generalize to other selective universities. 
However, we are encouraged by the fact that other institutions seem quite similar to the 
university we study with respect to other variables that affect giving. Hence, behavior 
with respect to the child-cycle might be similar as well. That said, it would be useful to 
investigate whether the child-cycle is present at other selective schools.
38 Similarly, it 
would be informative to study the trajectory of alumni giving at non-selective schools. 
At such schools, the child-cycle is not operative, and hence we would expect to see a 
path of alumni giving with respect to children’s age that is less steep, and that exhibits 
less of a falloff after the child’s admissions decision.  
 
                                                 
38 By definition, the child-cycle can be operative only at selective schools.     31 
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Table 1* 
Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Description  Mean  Standard 
Deviation
TotalYear  Total giving for year in 2006 dollars  466.14  49512 
LogTotalYear Log  of  total giving for year in 2006 dollars  2.425 2.425 
Didgive  1 if any donation given in year   0.5563  0.4968 
Annual Classleader  1 if giving was at or above the 90
th percentile in the alum-
nus’s class for a given year  0.1207 0.3258 
Yearssince  Number of years since graduation  12.05  7.826 
Yearssince2  Number of years since graduation, squared  206.5  231.3 
Spouseisalum  1 if the spouse is an alumnus  0.1302  0.3365 
Male  1 if the alumnus is male  0.6507  .4768 
Race/Ethnicity 
 
White  Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus is White  0.8195  0.3846 
Amerind  1 if the alumnus is a Native American  0.00363  0.06012 
Black  1 if the alumnus is Black  0.06929  0.2539 
Hispanic  1 if the alumnus is Hispanic  0.03798  0.1911 




Public  Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus attended public school   0.5792  0.4937 
Boarding  1 if the alumnus attended boarding school  0.1395  0.3464 
Private  1 if the alumnus attended private school  0.2622  0.4398 
Schloth  1 if the alumnus attended another type of school  0.01916  0.1371 
SATmath  SAT math score. Scores prior to 1996 are adjusted to re-
flect recentering of the scoring scale.  703.1 75.95 
SATverbal  SAT verbal score. Scores prior to 1996 are adjusted to re-







Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus received the highest non-
academic ranking from the admissions office  0.03220 0.1765 
B  1 if the alumnus received the second highest non-academic 
ranking from the admissions office  0.4660 0.4988 
C  1 if the alumnus received the third highest non-academic 
ranking from the admissions office  0.4188 0.4934 
D  1 if the alumnus received the fourth highest non-academic  0.07897 0.2697    
ranking from the admissions office 
E  1 if the alumnus received the fifth highest non-academic 







Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus received the highest aca-
demic ranking from the admissions office  0.1536 0.3605 
B  1 if the alumnus received the second highest academic rank-
ing from the admissions office  0.4242 0.4942 
C  1 if the alumnus received the third highest academic ranking 
from the admissions office  0.2708 0.4444 
D  1 if the alumnus received the fourth highest academic rank-
ing from the admissions office  0.1435 0.3506 
E  1 if the alumnus received the fifth highest academic ranking 
from the admissions office  0.0079 0.08858 
Varsity  1 if the alumnus played on a varsity team  0.3892  0.4876 
Clubsport  1 if the alumnus played on a club team  0.1728  0.3780 
Honors  1 if the alumnus graduated magna, summa, or cum laude  0.4532  0.4978 




Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus majored in molecular 
biology    
Small Social  
Sciences 
1 if the alumnus majored in Anthropology, Urban Studies, or 
Sociology.  0.02940 0.1689 
English  1 if the alumnus majored in English  0.1073  0.3095 
Economics  1 if the alumnus majored in Economics  0.07949  0.2705 
Public Policy  1 if the alumnus majored in Public Policy  0.05841  0.2345 
Political Science  1 if the alumnus majored in Political Science  0.08796  0.2832 
Psychology  1 if the alumnus majored in Psychology  0.04890  0.2157 
History  1 if the alumnus majored in History  0.1182  0.3229 
MAE  1 if the alumnus majored in Mechanical/Aerospace Engineer-
ing  0.03534 0.1846 
EE/CS  1 if the alumnus majored in Electrical Engineering or Com-
puter Science  0.05533 0.2286 
Arch & Civ  1 if the alumnus majored in Architecture or Civil Engineer-
ing  0.07040 0.2558 
Small Humanities 
1 if the alumnus majored in Art, Art History, Classics, East 
Asian Studies, Linguistics, Music, Near Eastern Studies, Phi-
losophy, Religion, or Languages and Literature departments 
0.1180 0.3226 
Small Engineering    1 if the alumnus majored in Engineering, Operations Re-
search and Financial Engineering, or Chemical Engineering  0.03132 0.1742 
Small Sciences  1 if the alumnus majored in Applied Mathematics, Astro- 0.1375 0.3444    
physics, Biochemistry, Biology, Chemistry, Ecology and Evo-





Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus received no minor  0.7673  0.4226 
African/African-
American Studies 
1 if the alumnus received a minor in African or African-
American Studies  0.02303 0.1500 
American Studies  1 if the alumnus received a minor in American Studies  0.02324  0.1507 
Latin  1 if the alumnus received a minor in Latin  0.00186  0.04305 
Finance  1 if the alumnus received a minor in Finance  0.00324  0.05683 
Theater  1 if the alumnus received a minor in Theater  0.01293  0.1130 
Public Policy  1 if the alumnus received a minor in Public Policy  0.05027  0.2185 
Other Engineering 
1 if the alumnus received a minor in Architecture, Basic En-
gineering, Bioengineering, Electrical Engineering, Geological 
Engineering, Management, Materials Sciences, or Robotics. 
0.01840 0.1344 
Other Sciences 
1 if the alumnus received a minor in Applied and Computa-
tional Mathematics, Biophysics, Cognitive Studies, Environ-
mental Studies, Science in Human Affairs, or Neuroscience. 
0.02731 0.1630 
Other Humanities  1 if the alumnus received a minor in a humanities field  0.05261  0.2233 
Teaching  1 if the alumnus received a teaching certificate  0.01377  0.1165 





Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus has no advanced degree  0.6053  0.4888 
PhD  1 if the alumnus has a Ph.D. or equivalent degree  0.06742  0.2508 
Masters  1 if the alumnus has a masters  0.1381  0.3450 
JD  1 if the alumnus has a JD  0.1004  0.3006 
MDDDS  1 if the alumnus has a medical degree  0.06173  0.2407 
MBA  1 if the alumnus has an MBA  0.08986  0.2860 
 
*Based on 487,913 observations on gift-giving from 1983 to 2006. 32,488 alumni who graduated from 1972 
to 2005 are represented.     
Table 2* 
Position and Field Definitions and Summary Statistics  
 
Variable Description  Mean  Standard 
Deviation
Field 
Arts  1 if the alumnus ever worked in the Arts field 
0.06254 0.2421 
Agriculture  1 if the alumnus ever worked in the Agriculture field  0.00187  0.04324 
Architecture  1 if the alumnus ever worked in the Architecture field  0.02516  0.1566 
Pharmaceuticals  1 if the alumnus ever worked in the Pharmaceuticals field  0.02336  0.1511 
Communications  1 if the alumnus ever worked in the Communications field  0.09619  0.2949 
Consulting  1 if the alumnus ever worked in the Consulting field  0.1009  0.3011 
Education  1 if the alumnus ever worked in the Education field  0.1222  0.3275 




1 if the alumnus ever worked in the Health Care field  0.1700  0.3756 
Hospitality  1 if the alumnus ever worked in the Hospitality field  0.00457  0.06743 
Information 
Technology  1 if the alumnus ever worked in the IT field  0.1150  0.3190 
Law  1 if the alumnus ever worked in the Law field  0.1883  0.3909 
Manufacturing  1 if the alumnus ever worked in the Manufacturing field  0.07509  0.2635 
Retail  1 if the alumnus ever worked in the Retail field  0.02251  0.1483 
Transportation  1 if the alumnus ever worked in the Transportation field  0.01014  0.1002 
Federal Govern-
ment  1 if the alumnus ever worked for the Federal Government   0.04406  0.2052 
State Govern-
ment  1 if the alumnus ever worked for a State Government  0.02515  0.1566 
Foreign Govern-
ment  1 if the alumnus ever worked for a Foreign Government  0.00275  0.05234 
Nongovernmental 
Organization  1 if the alumnus ever worked in the NGO field  0.02832  0.1659 
Religion  1 if the alumnus ever worked in the Religion field  0.01052  0.1020 
Other  1 if the alumnus ever worked in another field  0.27108  0.4445 
Multilateral Or-
ganization 
1 if the alumnus ever worked in the Multilateral Organization 
field  0.00191 0.04371 








1 if the alumnus ever worked in some miscellaneous occupa-
tion  0.08177 0.2740 
Physician/Dentist  1 if the alumnus ever worked as a physician or dentist  0.1339  0.3405 
White Collar  1 if the alumnus ever worked in a white collar occupation  0.3079  0.4616 
Attorney  1 if the alumnus ever worked as an attorney  0.2673  0.4426 
Executive  1 if the alumnus ever worked as an executive  0.4863  0.4998 
 
 
*Based on 344,342 observations on gift-giving from 1983 to 2006 for individuals for whom data on field 
and position are reported. 20,039 alumni who graduated from 1972 to 2005 are represented. 
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* Column (1) shows incremental effects on the probability of making a gift in a given year; column (2) 
shows incremental effects on the logarithm of amount of gift in a given year, and column (3) shows in-
cremental effects on the probability that the individual gave a gift greater than or equal to the top 10 
percent in a given year. Results in columns (1) and (3) are marginal effects generated by a probit model. 
Column (2) reports marginal effects generated by a Tobit model. Columns (1) and (2) use the basic sam-
ple of 487,913 observations. Column (3) uses a slightly smaller sample, 487,873, because some observa-
tions are dropped due to collinearity. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Figures in italics are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering based on individuals. 
In addition to the variables listed, the regressions in columns (1) and (2) include location effects, year 
effects and class effects, which are suppressed for brevity. The regression in column (3) includes location 























































































This figure graphs the child-cycle coefficients from column (1) of Table 3, using 487,913 observations. The vertical axis shows the incremental ef-
fect on the probability of making a gift in a given year as a function of the first child’s age and admissions status.  
    



























































This figure graphs the child-cycle coefficients from column (2) of Table 3, using 487,913 observations. The vertical axis shows the incremental effect on the 
log of amount donated in a given year as a function of the first child’s age and admissions status.     







































































This figure graphs the child-cycle coefficients from column (3) of Table 3, using 487,873 observations. The vertical axis shows the incremental effect on the 
probability of being a class leader (making a donation at least as large as the upper 10 percent of gifts of all gifts) in a given year as a function of the first 
child’s age and admissions status.     
Figure 4: Incremental Effect of the Child-Cycle on the Amount Given 


























































This figure graphs the analogs to the child-cycle coefficients from column (2) of Table 3, using 344,342 observations, when the basic model is re-estimated 
including information on alumni’s fields and positions. The vertical axis shows the incremental effect on the log of amount donated in a given year as a 
function of the first child’s age and admissions status.    



























































This figure graphs the analogs to the child-cycle coefficients from column (2) of Table 3, using 482,760 observations, when the basic model is re-estimated 
using the last child’s age and admissions status rather than the first child’s. The vertical axis shows the incremental effect on the log of amount donated in 
a given year as a function of the first child’s age and admissions status.  
    
 
Figure 6: Incremental Effect of the Child-Cycle on the Probability of Making a Gift







































































This figure graphs the analogs to the child-cycle coefficients from column (1) of Table 3 when the basic model is re-estimated with OLS and fixed effects. 
The vertical axis shows the incremental effect on the probability of making a gift in a given year as a function of the first child’s age and admissions 
status.   
 
Figure 7: Incremental Effect of the Child-Cycle on the Amount Given



















































This figure graphs the analogs to the child-cycle coefficients from column (2) of Table 3 when the basic model is re-estimated with OLS and fixed effects. 
The vertical axis shows the incremental effect on the logarithm of the amount of giving in a given year as a function of the first child’s age and admissions 
status.    
 
Figure 8: Incremental Effect of the Child-Cycle on the Probability of Being a Class Leader







































































This figure graphs the analogs to the child-cycle coefficients from column (3) of Table 3 when the basic model is re-estimated with OLS and fixed effects. 
The vertical axis shows the incremental effect on the probability of being a class leader in a given year as a function of the first child’s age and admissions 
status.   








































































This figure graphs the analogs to the child-cycle coefficients from column (1) of Table 3, using 939,671 observations, when the basic model is estimated 
with a sample that includes alumni who graduated before 1972. This sample has more observations, but is lacking information on a number of covariates. 
The vertical axis shows the incremental effect on the probability of making a gift in a given year as a function of the first child’s age and admissions 
status.    




























































This figure graphs the analogs to the child-cycle coefficients from column (2) of Table 3, using 939,671 observations, when the basic model is estimated 
with a sample that includes alumni who graduated before 1972. This sample has more observations, but is lacking information on a number of covariates. 
The vertical axis shows the incremental effect on the log of amount donated in a given year as a function of the first child’s age and admissions status.    








































































This figure graphs the analogs of the child-cycle coefficients from column (3) of Table 3, using 939,569 observations, when the basic model is estimated 
with a sample that includes alumni who graduated before 1972. This sample has more observations, but is lacking information on a number of covariates. 
The vertical axis shows the incremental effect on the probability of being a class leader (making a donation greater than or equal to the 90
th percentile in 
one’s class for that year).    




























































This figure graphs the analogs to the child-cycle coefficients from column (2) of Table 3, using 487,913 observations, when the basic model is estimated in 
levels rather than logarithms. The vertical axis shows the incremental effect on the number of dollars donated in a given year as a function of the first 
child’s age and admissions status.     
Appendix Figure A2: Incremental Effect of the Child-Cycle on the Amount Given






























































This figure graphs the analogs to the child-cycle coefficients from column (2) of Table 3, using 483,034 observations, when the basic model is estimated in 
levels rather than logarithms and the top 1 percent of gifts are deleted from the sample. The vertical axis shows the incremental effect on the number of 
dollars donated in a given year as a function of the first child’s age and admissions status. 